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Abstract. In this paper we analyse some logical notions relevant for rep-
resenting the dynamics of institutionalised organisations. In particular,
some well-known action concepts introduced in the Kanger-Lindahl-Po¨rn
logical theory of agency are discussed and integrated. Secondly, moving
from the work of Jones and Sergot, a logical characterisation is provided
of the ideas of institutional links, “counts-as” connections, and institu-
tional facts . This approach is then enriched by a new modal operator
proc, intended to account for the autonomous and decentralised creation
of new institutional facts and normative positions within institutions.
1 Introduction
In recent work on agents and on their societies, a specific normative line of
research has been emerging. This research assumes that as in human societies,
also in artificial societies normative concepts may play a decisive role, allowing
for the flexible co-ordination of intelligent autonomous agents (see the previous
proceeding of the workshops of Norms and Agents [9]).
We also believe that the adoption of a normative perspective, would allow a
substantial progress in the creation of agent societies, a progress that would be
even more important for societies where humans and agents interact (see [16]).
However, one necessary precondition for the development of norm-governed
societies consists in a precise logical account of normative notions (think about,
e.g., software agents applications). Moreover, logical precision should not impede
such an account from being practical, that is able of easily capturing the most
significant normative structures (duties, powers, responsibilities, contracts, and
so on).
Some significant steps in this direction have been accomplished in recent
years (we mention the proceeding of the DEON conferences, which show how
normative logic has been moving into the direction above indicated). In partic-
ular we will refer here to the tradition of research which starts with the work of
Scandinavian logicians and legal theorists, such as Kanger, Lindhal, and Po¨rn
(see for a review [12], and continues with the work of Carmo, Jones, Sergot, and
their colleagues ([29, 18]).
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In this paper we will move from the latter tradition, and after commenting on
previous work on action, “counts-as” connections, and institutionalised power,
and identifying some issues, we will attempt at providing some new solutions.
In this spirit, we will provide some refinements to the action framework, a fresh
account of the idea of “counts-as” connections, a general type of normative
speech act (proclamation), a specific type of institutional power (declarative
power) and an analysis of hierarchies over agents.
2 Actions and Obligations
Let us first outline the logic adopted here to deal with the concepts of action
and obligation.
Our approach falls within the well-known Kanger-Lindahl-Po¨rn logical the-
ory designed to account for agency and organised interaction (see [12]). More
precisely, our aim is to extend and take advantage of what developed by F. San-
tos, A. Jones and J. Carmo in [28, 29] (in the following SJC). Such an approach
is well-suited for our purposes because actions are viewed at a very abstract level
and are simply taken to be relationships between agents and states of affairs. In
addition, it is permitted to easily combine action concepts with other modalities
(for a critical discussion, see [12, 33]). Let us recall the set of action concepts
discussed there. In short, SJC use three kinds of action operators: E, G and H.
The first is the well-known operator expressing direct and successful actions: a
formula like EiA means that the agent i brings it about that A. The second one
corresponds to indirect and successful actions so that the reading of GiA is that
i ensures that A. Finally, the intended meaning of H is such that HiA means
that i attempts to make it the case that A. The idea is that H is not necessarily
successful. Following their approach, the logic for such operators is provided by
the following axiom schemas and rules.
For E:
EiA→ A (1)
(EiA ∧ EiB)→ Ei(A ∧B) (2)
¬Ei> (3)
` A ≡ B
` EiA ≡ EiB (4)
Notice that SJC also accept the following schema:
EiEjA→ ¬EiA (5)
for which EiA expresses the idea that the agent i brings it about that A directly
and personally. In general, we think that this is a correct reading of the operator
E. However, for our purposes we feel that the axiom (5) sometimes turns out
to be too strong. Suppose that i brings it about that John is greeted and that
i brings it about that another agent j brings it about that John is greeted.
Why is this situation contradictory? Actually, in counterexamples like this, the
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adoption of (5) has the same consequences as saying that the an action cannot
be performed by more than one agent:
EiA→ ¬EjA, where i 6= j (6)
This assumption may be viewed as a principle of rationality for institutional
organisations: It is counterintuitive that the same agent brings it about that A
and brings it about that somebody else achieves A. However, the above example
shows that this criterion does not apply to all cases. Consequently, we prefer not
to validate the schema (5).
To differentiate the operator E from G we will assume only that the latter
is characterised by the following axiom:
GiGjA→ GiA (7)
On the other hand, similar principles as (1), (2), (3) and (4) apply also to G.
A counterpart of (7) holds for H, which also shares with the previous oper-
ators similar principles such as those expressed by (2) and (4) for E.
Let us see now some interaction axioms from [29]:
EiA→ GiA (8)
GiEjA→ GiGjA (9)
EiEjA→ EiGjA (10)
GiA→ GiEiA (11)
In addition, SJC also accept:
GiA→ HiA (12)
EiGjA→ EiHjA (13)
GiGjA→ GiHjA (14)
HiEjA→ HiGjA (15)
HiGjA→ HiHjA (16)
Let us focus now on the operator H. In general, one of the main reasons
why H is useful in a normative domain is that it is not necessarily successful,
and therefore it may be used to model the idea of normative influence, that is
the influence which is exercised by imposing obligations over an agent. Such an
influence is not necessarily successful for the reason that OGjA does not imply
that A: an obligation does entail its fulfilment.
First of all, let us define a suitable logic for obligations. Besides the well-
known drawbacks connected with the treatment of logical structures such as
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contrary-to-duty obligations1, it is clear that Standard Deontic Logic (SDL)
is not adequate for combining deontic and action operators. For example, in
SDL OEiA implies that OA, which we feel unacceptable. For similar reasons,
OEiEjA → OEjA is a theorem of SDL. However, this cannot be accepted be-
cause the personal obligation on i should not imply a personal obligation on
j [27].
To avoid this problem, we assume that the logic for O contains only the
following axioms
(OA ∧OB)→ O(A ∧B) (17)
OA→ ¬O¬A (18)
and is closed under classical logical equivalence (see [16]).
Given the above premise, we can represent normative influence by way of
expressions like EiOGjA. In this regard SJC, accept the following axiom:
EiOGjA→ HiGjA (19)
We believe that this principle (19) is quite reasonable insofar as, as we said,
normative influence is a special kind of not necessarily successful influence over
agents. On the other hand, we have some doubts concerning a further principle
advanced in [29]. SJC propose the following axiom (though relativised to the
counts-as operator ⇒s, which we discuss in the following section):
(GiOGjA ∧GjA)→ GiA (20)
Actually, they point out that (20) is not a logical principle but it can be adopted
or not depending on the nature of the institution considered2. Even in this case,
we believe that such a principle is too strong. In fact, even within an institution,
¬GiA should be consistent with both GiOGjA and GjA since it is possible that
j pays no attention to the obligation that i has imposed upon him, (and even
that he does not know of his obligation). For example, suppose that a military
commander orders his soldiers to kill their prisoners. Assume that the order
does not reach one soldier (who is fighting in a far away place), but that this
soldier still kills a prisoner, according to his autonomous decision. We do not
believe that in any reasonable institution, in such a case one may say that the
commander ensured that the prisoner was killed, and consider him responsible
for that.
1 By the way, we feel this is an important issue for a future development of convincing
logical frameworks in which action operators and obligations are combined. In fact,
since contrary-to-duty obligations may be conceived of as reparational obligations of
violated norms, a full analysis of the concept of “violability” could shed a new light
on notions like those of responsibility and delegation. See [7], where these concepts
are analysed to cover situations where an agent has the power (or is obliged) to
perform a given task but is also obliged to make reparation if she fails in such a task.
2 In other words, (20) is changed into (GiOGjA∧GjA)⇒s GiA. According to the same
intuition, notice that they also adopt another axiom schema, that is (OGjA∧A)⇒s
GjA.
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Other problems arise with (20). In fact, it may be the case that two (or
more) different agents i and k ascribe to j the same obligation to realise A. If
we have that GjA, what conclusion have we to get? Actually, such a problem
is acknowledged in [28] but the solution advanced there is once again that of
confining the conclusion of GiA and GkA to an institution3. It has been noted
in [7] that a principle like (20) usually holds in norm-governed organisations. We
agree that something similar may be given in some kind of institutions. Anyway,
we feel that in (20) something is missing.
Notice also that, in the analysis developed in [7], G is defined in a slightly
different way as in [28, 29]:
GiA =def EiA ∨ (∃j1 . . .∃jk(EiOGj1A ∧ · · · ∧ Ejk−1OGjkA ∧ EjkA)) (21)
GiA means that i ensures that A, namely that either i brings it about that A or
that there is a deontic channel between i and a final agent jk such that jk brings
it about that A. First of all, it is worth noting that (21) implies (20) but on this
principle we have already put forth some doubts. More generally, we believe that
G does not actually express a true relation of deontic influence between agents.
The fact that jk brings it about that A can be just a contingent action of jk
with respect to each of the intermediate obligations stated by the other agents
in the deontic channel. As far as we can understand the matter, an influence
channel via obligations is expressed by the nesting and the simple iteration of
obligations and action operators.
In this perspective, we believe that it could be useful to introduce a new
action operator EI to express that an agent attempts to make it the case that
A by creating, directly of indirectly a channel of deontic influence terminating
with A.
The operator EI could be defined by means of an induction axiom as follows:
EIiA ≡ GiOGjA ∨
j≤i∨
j∈Ag≤
GiOEIjA (22)
Obviously, the logic for EI should be characterised at least by the following
axiom:
EIiA→ HiA (23)
In this perspective, it is worth noting that a hierarchy between agents can
play an important role in characterising EI. Suppose ≺ stands for a such a
relation of hierarchy4. Thus, since we want a hierarchy of agents being rational,
the following formula holds
(EiOGjA ∧ EjOGiA ∧ i ≺ j)→ ⊥ (24)
We should also have that
3 Notice also that this conclusion is in contrast with the idea expressed in (5) and (6).
4 See Section 4.2 for its formal definition.
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(EIiA ∧ EjOGiA ∧ i ≺ j)→ ⊥ (25)
In other words, both explicit and implicit “circular” chains of deontic control
are not permitted.
Technically speaking, the semantic characterisation of EI is quite simple.
Let us just suggest very briefly some intuitions about how to do it. Consider the
following neighborhood model structure:
〈W,RO, RE , RG, RH , Ag≤, V 〉
where W is the set of worlds; RO is a function with signature 2W 7→ 2W ; RE ,
RG and RH are functions with signature Ag≤ × 2W 7→ 2W ; Ag≤ is the ordered
set of agents; V is the usual valuation function. Accordingly, the truth in a world
w of the expression EiA is defined as follows:
M, w |= EiA iff w ∈ RE(i, ‖A‖)
where ‖A‖ = {w :M, w |= A}. Similar truth-conditions apply to the opera-
tors G and H5.
If we assume, as we do, that Ag≤ is finite, then EI is not a primitive operator
but corresponds, for some agents j ∈ Ag≤, to one or more iterations of modalities
of the kind Gi(OGjn)
n, where n ≥ 1. Accordingly, the semantics for EI is quite
simple. Since (22) generates iterated sequences of Gi(OGjn) it is not hard to see
that EI has a neighborhood interpretation in structures where a supposed REI
is nothing but the iterative composition of the union of the function RGi ◦ RO.
Accordingly, if R∗ is the transitive closure of such a composition, then M, w |=
EIiA iff w ∈ R∗(‖A‖).
Notice that, where Ag≤ is infinite, EI must be introduced as a primitive
operator. In fact, its definition in (22) would not be well-founded since it pro-
duces an infinite regression. How to deal with this case would require some extra
technicalities and will not be discussed here. This is an interesting issue that will
be a matter of future work.
3 The ‘Counts as’ Link
3.1 Jones and Sergot’s Analysis
A. Jones and M. Sergot [18] (abbreviated as JS in the following) have developed
a formal approach to the notion of institutionalised power by introducing a new
conditional connective ‘⇒s’. Such a connective is intended to express the ‘counts
as’ connection holding in the context of an institution s as described, notably,
5 The model presented here is slightly different with respect to that usually adopted
for all these operators. See [29] for the definition of the constraints onM to validate
the axioms schemas recalled above. Such constraints can be easily reformulated for
the model structure we have proposed.
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by Searle [30]. In other words, when applied to action description, a conditional
A ⇒s B says that action A counts as (or generates, cf. [15]) action B. Notice
that this is frequently used in the law: when there is a set of rules which link
a certain legal effects to action (or situation) B, and the law wants the same
effects to be linked also to a different action (or situation) A, then the law says
that A counts as B (for the purpose of the achievement of those effects).
Following Chellas’ terminology [5], the logic provided by JS for ⇒s is a
classical (but not normal) conditional logic6. In addition, it is characterised by
the following axiom schemas:
((A⇒s B) ∧ (A⇒s C))→ (A⇒s (B ∧ C)) (26)
((A⇒s B) ∧ (C ⇒s B))→ ((A ∨ C)⇒s B) (27)
and, possibly, by
(A⇒s B)→ ((B ⇒s C)→ (A⇒s C)) (28)
JS’s analysis is then integrated by introducing the normal KD modality Ds.
This is suggested to express all constraints on s among which the link ‘counts as’
is included. In other words, DsA means that A is “recongnised by the institution
s” [29]. Accordingly, it is adopted the following schema:
(A⇒s B)→ Ds(A→ B) (29)
Besides the general meaning of Ds, one of the main consequences of Ds is to
make possible a restricted version of detachment of the consequent of ⇒s. In
fact, by accepting
(A⇒s B)→ (A→ DsA) (30)
it can be derived that
(A⇒s B)→ (A→ DsB) (31)
In other words, if A⇒s B and A, then B should be the case in s, namely DsB.
3.2 A New Proposal
In this section, we will provide a fresh characterisation of the counts-as con-
nection that, though preserving most properties of the model of JS, adopts a
different perspective.
Rather then introducing a separate logic for the counts-as connection, and
then linking it with a Ds logic (relativised to the particular institution under
consideration), we use one conditional operator V to express any normative
connections or constants, in any institutions.
In addition, we will use the Ds operator as in [18] but we will apply it to
the consequent of such conditional links, in order to relativise this consequent to
the particular institution under consideration. We argue that any institution can
6 In other words, the logic for ⇒s contains the rules RCEA and RCEC but not RCM.
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only state what normative situation holds for itself, given certain conditions, but
according to a general type of conditionality. Actually, we can have different types
of facts between which a conditional link may hold with regard to an institution
s: (1) links between brute facts and s-facts (raising one’s hand is making a bid),
(2) links between s-facts and other s-facts (making a bid is a contractual offer)
, (3) links between s′-facts and s-facts, where s′ is an institution different from
s (a catholic or muslim marriage counts as a civil marriage).
By applying the Ds modality to the antecedents or to the consequents of our
conditionals we can easily express and clearly distinguish all those connections.
So let us first try to characterise a normative conditional V? Actually, we
have different options depending on the approach we want to adopt. For ex-
ample, we can view V either as a monotonic or a nonmonotonic link. Let us
focus in particular on the second alternative since it is widely acknowledged
that normative reasoning is basically defeasible (cf. [23]; see, in general, [24])7.
In this perspective, a number of diverse choices are available. One could be that
of adopting a logical machinery for dealing with defeasible logic [22, 1, 25]. Oth-
erwise, along the same line followed by JS, it is possible to define a conditional
operator V within a framework of conditional logic. For example, it seems rea-
sonable to view it at least as the conditional counterpart of the nonmonotonic
preferential system (see [2, 19, 10]). In fact, such a system embodies the minimal
properties without which it should not be considered a logical system, plus the
rule Or (see here below, axiom 35). This last property, accepted in its deontic
version, e.g., in the Hansson-Lewis account of conditional obligations [20, 26], is
also needed to model the count-as link (cf. [18]; see also the previous section).
In other words, the logic forV contains besides classical propositional logic, the
following axioms
AV A (32)
(AV B) ∧ (A ∧B V C)→ (AV C) (33)
(AV B) ∧ (AV C)→ (A ∧B)V C) (34)
(AV C) ∧ (B V C)→ (A ∨B)V C) (35)
and is closed under the usual inference rules
A ≡ B
(AV C)→ (B V C) (RCEA)
and
(A1 ∧ · · · ∧An)→ B
(C V A1 ∧ · · · ∧ C V An)→ (C V B) (RCK )
This logic, which is nothing but Burgess [3] system S, permits to derive as a
theorem the following restricted version of transitivity [21]:
((A ∧B)V C)→ ((AV B)→ (AV C)) (36)
7 For some short remarks on this matter, see also the next section.
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We think this is a good thing because, even in our approach, some form of
transitivity forVs is highly desirable. Although we are aware that this restricted
version could not be fully satisfactory we have not been able to find examples
where (36) is not adequate.
So far, so good. However, some problems are still open.
What about the detachment of the consequent? Instead of adopting (29)-(31),
we propose the following rule for V:
Γ ` A Γ ` AV B
Γ ` B (37)
where, for any formula A′, if Γ ` A′ → A, then Γ 6` A′ V ¬B.
This is a restricted version of Modus Ponens for the conditional V. It ex-
presses the idea, well-know in nonmonotonic reasoning, that the detachment of
the consequent is blocked when a more specific conditional permits to infer a
conflicting conclusion. In fact, we want a set of formulas Γ be consistent when,
e.g., Γ = {A V B,A ∧ C Vs ¬B}. In this case, however, the truth of A does
not imply B whereas this is possible when A ∧ C holds.
Let us give now a suitable characterisation of the “institutional modality”
Ds. We believe that the logic for such an operator should be closed under logical
equivalence and contain the following axiom schemas:
DsA→ ¬Ds¬A (38)
(DsA ∧DsB)→ Ds(A ∧B) (39)
Notice that we do not accept the necessitation rule. Since the intended mean-
ing of this modality is to express the domain of the institutional facts holding
in a given institution, the lack of necessitation is reasonable: it sounds strange
that > is an institutional fact for any institution s.
Finally, on the basis of V we can define a relativised operator Vs operator,
which behaves similarly to ⇒ of JS. For this purpose we need to combine a link
A V DsB from a brute fact to an institutional fact, and a link DsA V DsB
from an institutional fact to another institutional fact.
In this perspective, we state the following definition:
(AVs B) =def (AV DsB) ∧ (DsAV DsB) (40)
3.3 A Comparison
Let us now compare the behavior of our logic to the original proposal of JS. Let
us first focus on the communalities.
Basically, the main commonality between the two approaches is that both al-
low for the detachment of institutional consequents from brute facts and count-as
conditionals: as in JS’s approach Ds(B) follows from A and A⇒s B, according
to (30, and 31), so in our approach Ds(B) follows from A and AVs B, accord-
ing to definition (40) (which implies A V Ds(B)) and inference rule (37). In
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addition, we accepted for our definition ofVs a great part of the axiom schemas
introduced by JS for⇒s. In particular theorems corresponding to axioms 26 and
27 can be derived in our system, on the basis of definition 40.
Let us now consider the differences between the two systems.
One significant difference between our approach and JS’s system is that our
approach allows for non-monotonic reasoning. We believe that nonmonotonicity
should be an essential property for the count-as link, but also in general for
any normative conditional. This is the reason why we would like to treat it in a
uniform way. Consider the following two examples.
In an auction if the agent i raises one hand, this may count as making a bid.
However, this does not hold if i raises one hand and scratches his own head.
However, we still want to have that “i’s raising one hand ‘counts as’ i’s making
a bid” and the fact that i raised one hand imply that i made a bid.
As an example that does not deal with count-as connections, consider the
classical fact that if one causes a damage, than one is liable, but this does not
happens if one is acting in self defence.
It seems clear to us that the type of nonmonotonic reasoning involved the
two example is exactly the same.
The main reason why JS’s approach cannot appropriately deal with non-
monotonicity is that it is joins two logical systems, the ⇒s and the Ds logics,
the second of which is monotonic. It is always possible to jump from the one into
the other, by using the axiom (29). Since the second, monotonic system is used
for the count-as detachment ((29)-(31), then this is necessarily monotonic. Even
if ⇒s logic were defeasible, defeated conclusions could be reinstated by moving
into the Ds logic. In addition, note that JS’s ⇒s logic includes transitivity, by
(28), which implies monotonicity (see [19]). As a matter of fact, as an alternative
to (28), they also propose
(A⇒s B)→ ((B ⇒s C)→ Ds(A→ C) (41)
which would solve the transitivity problem, but still would not overcome the
above critique.
A second significant difference between the two approaches concerns weak-
ening of the consequent. As JS pointed out, this property should not hold for
the count-as link: it is quite odd that, in an auction, ‘raising one hand counts
as making a bid’ implies the sentence ‘raising one hand counts as making a
bid or drinking some water’. However, the combination of the count-as and the
Ds logics, which is a normal modality KD leads to the weakening of institu-
tional consequences: A and A⇒s B imply Ds(B), which implies Ds(B∨C). For
example, in JS’s system
(raising one hand)⇒s (making a bid)
implies
Ds((raising one hand)→ ((making a bid) ∨ (drinking some water)))
Actions, Institutions, Powers. Preliminary Notes 141
In our system weakening of institutional consequences does not hold, since
we define Ds in terms a non-normalD modality without necessitation and axiom
K, thus avoiding that Ds is closed under logical consequence8.
In fact, the K schema was needed in JS’s approach to guarantee detachment
of institutional consequents through material implications modalised by Ds.
Obviously, because of the new characterisation of Ds and of our definition of
the count-as link, the adoption RCK forV is not problematic since it determines
the closure of V under logical consequence only when the consequent is not
modalised by Ds.
4 Proclamation and Declarative Power
On the basis of the notions introduced in the previous section, we will now
analyse a phenomenon which has a major importance in legal and similar insti-
tutions: this is the decentralised intentional creation of new normative positions.
We will first describe the actions (i.e., proclamations) which maybe used to cre-
ate those positions, and then we will consider the institutional rules making
those actions effective, and finally we will analysis the power which these rules
attribute (declarative power).
4.1 The Notion of Proclaiming
The idea of proclaiming is used to cover all those speech acts by which a subject
makes a statement expressing a certain proposition, and this statement has the
function (purpose, point or objective) of making this proposition true. So, we say
that one subject i proclaims that A when i makes a statement which expresses
A, and has the function of realising A.
The type of speech act we have so defined has some interesting peculiarities.
First, note that it is neutral in regard to intention-based [14] and non
intention-based theories of speech acts [17]. By saying that the proclamation
that A has the function to achieve A we do not specify how the notion of func-
tion is to be characterized: it may be determined by the intention of the speaker,
by the intention attributed to the speaker by its interlocutor, by a shared con-
vention, by a communication protocol, etc. What is sufficient, for our purpose, is
that the act has a word to world direction of fit [31], that is that has the function
to change the normative world to make it fit the content of the act.
Secondly, note that a proclamation is not necessarily effective (it does not
necessarily produce A). When the notion of function is interpreted with reference
to the intention of the speaker it necessarily involves an attempt to achieve A,
but this attempt may not be successful. Whether it is successful or not, within
a certain institutional context, depends on whether that institution makes it
8 The reader who feels this choice unsatisfactory has a different option. It is enough
to give up the necessitation rule for Ds. In this way, axiom K can be retained,
thus obtaining a quasi-normal system [32, ch. 3]. However, this option will not be
considered here.
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effective. It is up to the institutional rules to establish whether i’s proclamation
that A, in the conditions in which it is made, produces A or not.
Thirdly, the idea of proclaiming is neutral in regard to what is proclaimed.
So a proclamation can play the role usually attributed to many different speech
acts. A proclamation of i can be an attempted commissive, as when its content
is OEiA, an attempted command, when refers to OEjA, with j different from i,
an attempt to free oneself from an obligation, as where its argument is ¬OEiA.
The notion of proclaiming is formalised by the operator proc. Such an oper-
ator will be indexed by agents. In this way, prociA means that i proclaims that
A. As said, proc is not necessarily successful and so we do not accept:
prociA→ A (42)
On the other hand, it is reasonable that the logic for this operator is closed under
logical equivalence and is characterised at least by the following axiom:
(prociA ∧ prociB) ≡ proci(A ∧B) (43)
Of course, we have also to accept the following axiom schema:
prociA→ HiA (44)
A matter we think deserves special attention is about the intended effects
of proc. A discussion of this question concerns how to represent the notion of
institutional power. For our purposes, it is worth distinguishing in particular
two kinds of power: the power to ascribe obligations and the power of conferring
powers to ascribe obligations.
Well, let us consider when a proclamation is effective. Unfortunately, there is
not much that we may say in general. We may just say that a proclamation
is effective if the concerned institution provides for its effectiveness, i.e. the
institution recognises that, by proclaiming A, one produces the normative state
A. This means that, if the concerned institution has (or possibly implies) a rule:
prociAVs EiA9, then, for the institution it holds that, by proclaiming that A,
i produces A. In other words, for the institution i’s proclamation that A counts
as (or generates) i’s production of A. Note that according to the action logic
above presented, EiA implies A. Therefore when a prociA is effective A should
follow. When an institution provides for the effectiveness of a proclamation to
the effect that A, we say that the subject of the proclamation has a declarative
power with respect to A:
DeclPow iA =df prociAVs EiA (45)
According to (45), if an agent i has the power over j to ascribe the obligation
to achieve A, the following formula holds:
prociOGjAVs EiOGjA (46)
9 Where, as we argued, prociA Vs EiA is an abbreviation of (prociA V DsEiA) ∧
(DsprociAV DsEiA).
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More generally, i’s power to ascribe an obligation also concern the creation of a
deontic channel according to a specific hierarchy. This means that i is empowered
to oblige other agents:
(prociOEIjAVs EiOEIjA) (47)
It is immediate to see that the following formula can be proved from (47:
(prociOGjAVs EIiA) (48)
On the other hand, i has the power to delegate the power to make it the case
that A if we have that
(proci(procjAVs EjA))Vs Ei(procjAVs EjA) (49)
Thus we are ready to define the notion of power to delegate powers of ascribing
obligations. Following (49), this can be trivially done as follows:
(proci(procjOGkAVs EjOGkA))Vs Ei(procjOGkAVs EjOGkA) (50)
or, more generally,
(proci(procjOEIkAVs EjOEIkA))Vs Ei(procjOEIkAVs EjOEIkA) (51)
We may also have a kind of power, which includes both the power of confer-
ring a power creating a normative position (an obligation or its negation) and
also the power of transferring to others a similar power. We define this type as
a sort of recursive power RecDeclPow . It can be formalised following a similar
idea as that expressed in (22) for EI. In other words,
RecDeclPow i(OGkA) ≡
DeclPow i(OGkA) ∧ (
k≤j≤i∧
j∈Ag≤
DeclPow i(RecDeclPow j(OGkA)))
(52)
The above formula means that the holder i of the recursive declarative power is
enabled to exercise his power in two ways. The first capacity DeclPow i(OGkA),
enables i to make so that k is obliged to realize A. The second capacity
DeclPow i(RecDeclPow j(OGkA)) enables i to transfer to another agent j the
same recursive declarative power which i possesses. This latter notion is useful
in those cases in which an organization is extended over multiple levels, and the
top level wants to delegate not only the performance of the action, but also the
command to perform it.
4.2 Hierarchy among Agents
As we have alluded to in the previous sections, to deal with the notion of power
we need to introduce an explicit relation of hierarchy ≺ among agents. How
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to characterise ≺? In [11], for instance, it is suggested that the power relation
should correspond to a partial ordering on the class of agents.
This characterisation is too weak for our purposes. What about a total or-
dering? It is clearly too strong: usually, an institution does not require that, for
each pair of agents, one is superior to the other. A reasonable condition is then
that ≺ corresponds to a total ordering with clusters. In other words, we have
that, for every two agents i and j such that
– i ∈ Agm and j ∈ Agn;
– Agm ⊆ Ag and Agn ⊆ Ag;
– Agm ∩Agn = ∅;
either i ≺ j or j ≺ i.
It is worth noting that this ordering is also dependent on the operator proc
and the connective Vs. In particular, it seems to be intuitive to reformulate
the declarative power of an agent i to ascribe obligations DeclPower iOGjA by
stipulating that ¬j ≺ i.
On the other hand, something stronger can be accepted. For instance, new
hierarchical relations between agents can be made explicit:
DeclPower iOGjAVs i ≺ j (53)
We think that also (53) is quite reasonable. If an agent i has the power to
ascribe obligations to another agent j, this mean, at least defeasibly, that i is
superior to j. However, accepting (53) could raise some problems for a semantic
treatment of ≺. In fact, since we have the detachment for Vs, (53) permits to
infer new hierarchical relations between agents. How to deal with question?
As usual, an action can be conceived as a transition between two states.
Obviously, a speech act is a very special kind of action. In this perspective, we
have to consider the dynamic corresponding to institutionalised speech acts, in
particular proc whose argument is either an obligation (e.g., OA or OEjA) or
an attribution of power (e.g., i ≺ j). Those actions transform the state actual
at the time of utterance in a state where the content of the speech act holds.
Semantically, we can analyse this kind of acts by means of two dimension hierar-
chical fibred models. Shortly and roughly a two dimensional hierarchical model
is a possible world structure where the points of the outer logic are models of the
inner logic and the points are related by a fibring function. For the application
at hand we can adopt a revision function as the fibring function of the model.
In other words, each time we can detach i ≺ j from DeclPower iOGjAVs i ≺ j
it is possible to define via the fibring function another model where i ≺ j holds
(see [13] for the technical details).
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have analysed some concepts useful to model the concept of
normative power. We have discussed some well-known action operators such as
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E, G, H and their combination with deontic logic. In this perspective, we have
thus introduced a new operator EI able to capture the idea of deontic influence
of an agent over an ordered set of agents. We have also argued that a convincing
account of the notion of power has to be integrated
1. by logically characterising the count-as link holding within institutions;
2. by introducing a new operator corresponding to the notion of proclaiming;
3. by making explicit a superiority (hierarchy) relation between agents.
As regards the first point, we started from the analysis of Jones and Ser-
got but developing a different logical characterisation. One of the aims of our
approach was designing a unique nonmonotonic conditional able to model both
the count-as link and other normative links. The resulting formalisation seems
to enjoy good properties, thus avoiding some limitations of JS’s system.
With regard to point 2 above, we have defined a new modal operator proc
to represent the speech act of proclaiming. The concept of proclaiming has thus
been combined with the count-as link in order to provide reasonable definitions
of agents’ power both to ascribe obligations and to transfer such a power to
other agents.The importance of communication and speech acts in normative
and institutional domains is widely acknowledged [34, 16, 11]. However, a com-
mon view in most approaches is that of providing as many operators as different
speech acts are needed. Accordingly, there are operators to represent assertives,
declarations, directives, commisives etc (see, e.g., [8]). We have argued for a dif-
ferent perspective according to which it is sufficient to devise only one “minimal”
speech act operator. As a consequence, differentiating the speech acts depends
on the specific nature of the argument in the scope of proc. For example, if an
obligation occurs within the scope of proc, the resulting speech act is nothing but
a directive. This approach strongly simplifies the logical machinery. However, it
seems to be enough to model the basic notions needed to describe the dynamics
of institutional systems.
Concerning point 3, we have introduced a binary connective ≺ to account
for explicit hierarchical relations between agents. This fact permits to introduce
some rational criteria within institutions, such as that of avoiding circular chains
of deontic influence. In a similar perspective, we have shown how it is possible
to derive superiority relations when a certain power (e.g., to ascribe obligations)
holds in a given institution.
Finally, we suggest a couple of refinements that could enrich the logical frame-
work presented in this paper.
For example, a realistic definition of the operator proc can be provided by
labelling such an operator both by the speaker of the speech act of proclaiming
(as we do here) and by its addressee. This fact could be useful, e.g., to model
situations where proc is iterated. Moreover, proc may transformed so that its
argument becomes a pair consisting of a statement s and a state of affairs A. In
this way, an expression like procj(A, s) would mean that the subject j proclaims
that A through s. In other words, proclaiming that A through statement s, j
produces A.
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In addition, the binary operator ≺ could be also indexed by formulas. Ac-
cordingly, i ≺A j means that i is superior to j with respect to the achievement
of A. This fact would make much more complicated the semantic interpretation
of this operator. On the other hand, it seems to reasonable to limit the power
of an agent over other agents only with reference to a specific pattern of ac-
tions and goals. In this perspective, notice that, in the presence of a rule like
A1, . . . , An V A we could have trivially the following rule:
i ≺A j A1, . . . , An V A
i ≺Ak j
(1 ≤ k ≤ n) (54)
Both the above refinements, plus a full characterisation (namely, by present-
ing a full semantics and metalogical results) of the operators here discussed are
matter of future work.
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